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In this paper, we explore the efficacy of a number of recent proposals for 
ameliorating the consequences of the zero lower bound on interest rates using 
simulations of the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model.  The zero bound on interest 
rates is a concern because central banks typically respond to weak aggregate 
demand conditions by lowering short-term interest rates.  But nominal interest 
rates cannot be reduced below zero, so some change in monetary-policy strategy 
may be needed at low levels of interest rates.  Interest in such strategies has 
increased in recent years because short-term interest rates have been very low in a 
number of countries: In Japan, the call money rate has been at or below 50 basis 
points since late 1995; in the United States, the federal funds rate was below 150 
basis points from late 2002 to mid-2004.   
 
Our focus in this note will be on strategies that alter expectations of future 
monetary policy when current interest rates are pinned at zero; such policies have 
been discussed by, among others, Krugman (1998), Reifschneider and Williams 
(2000), and Eggertson and Woodford (2003).  Most alternative policies that have 
been proposed operate through liquidity or portfolio-balance channels for 
affecting, for example, long-term interest rates exchange rates (see, for example, 
Clouse et al., 2000).  But most empirical studies suggest that such channels are 
not very large, if they exist at all.  Because of the lack of strong empirical support 
for such effects, they are not part of the FRB/US model, and so, given our focus 
on that model, we are not well-suited to evaluate them. 
 
The strategies we focus on work by promising to keep real future short-term 
interest rates lower than otherwise, which, under the expectations hypothesis of 
the term structure, will lower real long-term interest rates today.  Such a strategy 
works because in FRB/US, as in many other macroeconomic models, current real 
long-term interest rates have important effects on current spending.  Of course, 
future real short-term rates are the difference between expected nominal rates and 
expected inflation, and future monetary policy can work on both of these pieces:  
Although current nominal interest rates may be pinned at zero, policy can work to 
lower expectations of future short-term rates.  And by promising looser policy in 
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the future, the central bank can hope to raise inflation expectations.   
 
Some earlier studies have examined the effects of changes in monetary policy 
using stylized models—for example, Wolman (2004) and Eggertson and 
Woodford (2003).  We believe that using a model such as FRB/US has 
advantages relative to these other models.  In FRB/US, a much-richer range of 
economic mechanisms is at work, and these additional mechanisms can point to 
drawbacks and advantages of certain policies.  For example, FRB/US includes 
many channels through which fiscal policy can affect the economy, and we use 
these to show how the efficacy of fiscal policy can be affected by the zero bound. 
 Moreover, the FRB/US model is estimated, and thus may provide a more-
realistic platform for policy evaluation. 
 
We limit ourselves to monetary policies that are similar in spirit to the well-
known Taylor rule.  In particular, we do not consider policies that have been 
chosen to optimize a particular social welfare function given the structure of the 
economy.  One reason for focusing on Taylor-rule-type policies rather than 
optimized policies is that the work of Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) and 
Taylor (1999) has suggested that there may be a good reason for central banks to 
eschew optimized rules: It appears that rules that have been optimized for one 
model may perform quite poorly in another model.  Given that there is a great 
deal of uncertainty about the true structure of the economy, a central bank would 
thus be ill-advised to choose any particular optimized policy.  By contrast, 
Taylor-type rules appear to provide at least adequate performance in a broad 
range of models (Taylor, 1999).  In addition, a variety of studies—such as 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and English, Nelson, and Sack (2003)—have 
argued that Taylor-type rules are a good approximation to actual central bank 
behavior. 
 
We consider a number of policies that have been proposed to mitigate the effects 
of the zero bound: 
   
• Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Reinhart (2004) have argued that a 
more-aggressive monetary policy can reduce the adverse effects of the 
zero bound.  We model this more-aggressive policy as larger coefficients 
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on output and, especially, inflation in a Taylor rule.   
• A central bank may promise to make up any shortfall in short-term 
nominal interest rates relative to the Taylor rule that occurs during a zero-
bound period. (Reifschneider and Williams, 2000).  Under such a policy, 
future short-term interest rates will be lower than they would be under the 
Taylor rule, and, in particular, will stay at zero beyond the period 
suggested by the Taylor rule.  
• A more-radical departure from the Taylor rule would be to replace the 
inflation-target component of the Taylor rule with a price-level target.  
Such a policy has been advocated by Wolman (2004) and Eggertson and 
Woodford (2003).   
• Another more-radical departure is the adoption of rules that link the 
change in the short-term interest rate to deviations of inflation and the 
output gap from their target levels.  Such rules have been advocated by 
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003). 
• Krugman (1998) has advocated raising the central bank’s inflation target 
permanently, or for a very long period, as a way of escaping a zero-bound 
episode. 
• And we consider proposals to limit the effects of the zero bound on 
nominal interest rates by reducing short-term interest rates more rapidly 
when the zero bound is imminent.   
  
In this paper, we focus on the effects of these various policies on the response of 
the economy to a specific shock.  In particular, we examine the effects of each 
policy in response to a shock that, under a baseline Taylor rule policy, would pin 
the short-term interest rate at zero for a period of four to five years.  We believe 
that such an approach is a useful complement to work such as Reifschneider and 
Williams (2000), which used stochastic simulations to consider how useful 
various policies might be at minimizing the consequences of the zero bound for 
economic outcomes under a full range of shocks.  The present approach allows us 
to more closely examine the economic mechanisms at work under the different 
policies. 
  
In considering the effects of such policies, we do not consider the question of 
central bank credibility in adopting a special strategy near the zero bound; in our 
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formal analysis, we assume that the central bank has complete credibility, in the 
sense that once the central bank announces a new policy, all agents are assumed 
to believe it.  It is clear why credibility may be an issue once the zero bound has 
been reached: Short-term interest rates are the usual way in which the central 
bank communicates its monetary-policy actions, and once the zero bound has 
been reached, this channel can=t be used.  Of course, if a policy has been in place 
for some time, then it is more reasonable to assume that expectations formation 
has adapted to the policy environment.  This is the implicit assumption behind the 
model-consistent expectations we assume in most of the simulations we run. 
 
While we think it is reasonable to suppose that such expectations are likely to be 
consistent with the typical dynamics produced by a monetary policy that has been 
in place for a long time, there is little evidence to suggest that the expectations of 
households and firms adjust quickly to an announced change in monetary policy.  
This calls into question how worthwhile the kind of policy changes that we are 
considering would be if adopted for the first time once the zero bound of interest 
rates has been reached.  However, one group of agents in the economy appears to 
be highly attuned to central bank statements: Financial markets appear to adjust 
very rapidly both to changes in policy rates and to statements about the central 
bank=s future intentions.   
 
We thus think it reasonable to assume that financial markets can respond rapidly 
to changes in monetary policy but that other agents in the economy may not 
respond as quickly.  Here, we have in mind expectations of firms and households 
in the setting of wages and prices, as well as expectations of future inflation that 
are used to determine the value of real interest rates used in investment decisions 
and similar calculations.  To explore the consequences of different degrees of 
rationality on the part of different agents in the economy, in section 3, we 
consider the possibility that while financial markets may fully adjust their 
expectations formation in the aftermath of a policy change, other agents continue 
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1.  Background and baseline simulations 
 
We use the Federal Reserve Board=s FRB/US model.  FRB/US is described in 
detail in Brayton et al. (1997).  For the present discussion, some important 
features of FRB/US are:   
 
$ The main behavioral relationships in FRB/US are derived from explicit 
optimization problems. 
$ Most key relationships in FRB/US are estimated.  In particular, 
considerable care has been taken to ensure that the key correlations among 
variables, including persistence, observed in the U.S. data are matched.  
$ In financial markets, standard arbitrage pricing is assumed.  Hence, a key 
element in the determination of long-term interest rates is current 
expectations of short-term interest rates; in addition, risk premiums are 
modeled as serially correlated and related to the expected state of the 
economy. 
$ We initially consider simulations in which expectations are model 
consistent (or “rational”).  In particular, in section 2, we assume that when 
monetary policy changes, expectations formationCand thus the dynamics 
of the economyCchange accordingly.  In section 4, we relax this 
assumption. 
 
We have chosen as our baseline assumption about monetary policy what we term 
the revised Taylor rule proposed in Taylor (1999).1  In particular, the Taylor rule 
can be written as: 
 
 rt = r* + πt + α (πt – π*t) + β gapt ,     (1) 
 
where rt is the short-term policy rate (for the United States, the federal funds 
rate), r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, πt is inflation, here defined to be the 
lagging four-quarter percent change, and gap is the output gap, defined to be the 
percent deviation of GDP from an estimate of its trend or potential level.  In the 
revised Taylor rule, α = 0.5 and β = 1.0 (in Taylor’s original rule, α = 0.5 and 
β = 0.5).  Taylor (1999) argues that the revised rule has been a good 
                                                 
1.  We discuss our fiscal policy assumptions in section 4.  
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representation of U.S. monetary policy since the mid-1980s.  In addition, Taylor 
argues that this rule does at least an adequate job of stabilizing the U.S. economy 
based on simulations of a broad range of models.2    
 
We have chosen to evaluate policies with respect to how they perform in the face 
of a particular shock to the economy.  This shock is a large, adverse shock to 
consumer spending that is assumed to persist for a number of years: The initial 
shock is equal to 1.2 percent of consumer spending and fades linearly to zero over 
the next six years.  In the base case, agents are assumed to know the duration of 
the shock.  The shock was chosen so that, under the baseline monetary policy, the 
federal funds rate is pinned at zero for four years.3    
 
Figure 1 shows the effect of the shock both with and without the zero bound on 
nominal interest rates imposed.  Looking first at the case in which the zero bound 
is not a constraint, the funds rate would drop below -2 percent, reaching a trough 
in the third year after the shock.  The zero bound exacerbates the depth of the 
recession:  Without the zero bound, the output gap would widen by about 
3-1/2 percentage points; with the zero bound imposed, the output gap is worsened 
to almost 5 percentage points.  While the outcome for output is affected 
importantly by the zero bound, the outcome for inflation is not much affected, 
with the economy experiencing four years of deflation in each case, and inflation 
reaching a minimum of -3/4 percent.  The interest rate on ten-year Treasuries falls 
sharply once the shock hits the economy, reflecting the assumption that the 
duration of the shock is immediately understood.  If agents took time to learn 
about the duration of the shock, long-term interest rates would decline more 
gradually.  Long-term rates fall about 75 basis points less when the zero bound is 
binding, consistent with agents’ (rational) expectations of future short-term 
interest rates. 
 
                                                 
2.  Some have argued that a more-realistic representation of U.S. monetary policy in recent years 
would incorporate the lagged funds rate in addition to the output and inflation gaps.  For example, 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) find a coefficient of 0.8 on the lagged funds rate and English, 
Nelson, and Sack (2003) find a coefficient of 0.7.  We experimented with equations such as this 
and found that, for present purposes, they made little difference. 
3.  Of course, even though the shock fades out linearly, its effects on the economy are more 
attenuated than this, owing to the dynamics of the model. 
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2.  Implications of alternative policy rules under model-consistent expectations 
 
In this section, we consider the effects of various alternatives to the baseline 
monetary policy. 
 
a.  More-aggressive Taylor rule 
 
The first set of policies that we consider maintain the general structure of the 
Taylor rule of equation 1 but use different parameters.  In particular, we consider 
more-aggressive parameters on both output and inflation, along the lines 
suggested by Henderson and McKibbin (1993).  We first consider a policy in 
which we raise the coefficient on inflation, α, from 0.5 to 2.0.  We then also raise 
the coefficient on the output gap, β, from 1.0 to 2.0.   
 
As can be seen in figure 1, a more aggressive Taylor rule helps mitigate the 
adverse effects of the zero bound on the output gap.  In the policy represented by 
the blue line, the coefficient on inflation is boosted from 0.5 to 2.0.  This policy 
change eliminates about half the adverse effects of the zero bound on the output 
gap.  Nonetheless, the period over which the interest rate is at zero is extended 
only slightly—by a quarter or two.  As a consequence, the interest rate on ten-
year Treasuries is little different.  Inflation is higher in this case, with the period 
of deflation now reduced to less than two years, because the central bank now 
pursues a policy that keeps inflation closer to its target.  Because expectations are 
forward-looking and current inflation is affected by expectations, this more-
aggressive policy also boosts inflation even when interest rates are at zero.  Note, 
however, that inflation never exceeds the target level of 1-1/2 percent, so even 
though inflation is higher, this outcome should be welcomed.  With nominal long-
term interest rates little different from the base case, it is the lower real interest 
rates brought on by higher inflation for that is the source of the extra stimulus in 
this case.  In the simulation represented by the green line, the coefficient on 
output in the Taylor rule is also boosted, from 1.0 to 2.0.  As can be seen, these 
results are little different from those which only the inflation parameter was 
boosted.   
 
In other results, not shown here, we found that boosting the coefficient on 
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inflation to 4.0 roughly undoes the effects of the zero bound on output under the 
baseline policy.  Hence, if a central bank wanted to maintain a policy that had the 
general structure of a Taylor rule, it could largely eliminate the adverse effects of 
the zero bound in the face of this sort of shock by adopting a policy that reacts 
more strongly to inflation.   
 
One advantage of such a policy is that a central bank could demonstrate that it has 
adopted it prior to a zero-bound episode, and thus could establish, through 
experience, that it had changed its policy.  As we noted in the introduction, it is 
likely that, aside from financial markets, agents learn about how monetary policy 
affects inflation through experience and not by working through the implications 
of a newly announced policy in their mental DGE models.  As we discuss in 
section 3, if expectations formation does not adjust to the new policy, then the 
benefits of the policy are greatly diminished.   
 
b.  Make-up rules 
 
We next consider a policy in which the central bank pledges to “make up” any 
shortfall in the interest rate once nominal interest rates reach zero.  As in 
Reifschneider and Williams (2000), we specify this policy as: 
 
 rt = r* + πt + 0.5 (πt – π*t) + 1.0 gapt  - γ Zt ,   
 (2) 
 
where Z is the cumulated past deviations of the short-term interest rate from the 
prescriptions of the standard Taylor rule.  In our simulations, we use γ = 0.5.   
 
The blue line in figure 2 shows the implications of the interest-rate make-up 
policy.  As can be seen, this policy prolongs the period that the interest rate stays 
at the zero bound by nearly two years.  It thus has a noticeable effect on the ten-
year Treasury rate.  The policy is quite effective at reducing the effect of the zero 
bound on the output gap, leading to an output trough that is only slightly deeper 
than when the zero bound is not binding, and, about three-and-a-half years after 
the shock, implying a somewhat higher level of output than under the baseline 
policy.  The period of deflation is less than three years in this case.  Over the ten-
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year horizon shown here, inflation never exceeds its long-run target.  The real ten-
year Treasury rate falls considerably more than in the baseline case, and initially 
makes up about half the shortfall owing to the zero bound.  Note that both higher 
inflation expectations and a lower long-term nominal interest rate play a role in 
the reduction of the real long-term rate, with higher expected inflation playing a 
somewhat more important role. 
 
At first glance, an advantage of the funds-rate make-up policy is that once 
sufficient time has past, monetary policy reverts to what it would otherwise have 
been.  This would be an advantage for a central bank that prefers a Taylor rule 
most of the time, and only wants to deviate from such a policy in exceptional 
circumstances.  But a corresponding disadvantage is that it is not possible to 
establish a reputation prior to the advent of a zero-bound episode.  Hence, the 
efficacy of this policy would depend heavily on the ability of the central bank to 
explain the policy once the zero bound on nominal interest rates has been reached. 
 
c.  Giving up too soon 
 
The green line in figure 2 illustrates the consequences of a central bank that 
abandons a make-up policy prematurely.  The motivation behind this scenario is 
that the central bank prefers the Taylor rule and, once the economy has largely 
recovered, reverts to its preferred policy.  In modeling this policy, we assume that 
private-sector agents correctly anticipate the central bank’s premature dropping of 
the policy.   
 
In this simulation, the central bank begins to raise rates two quarters earlier than 
in the full make-up case, and fully reverts to the Taylor rule a year-and-a-half 
earlier. At the point that the central bank reverts to the Taylor rule, the output gap 
has recovered more than 90 percent of its loss at the trough and inflation is back 
above ½ percent.  Although this early move back to the Taylor rule may seem like 
a small deviation from the full make-up rule, as can be seen from the output gap, 
it turns out to undo much of the benefit of the make-up policy.  One part of the 
story is that nominal long-term interest rates fall by less.  But inflation, which is 
considerably lower in the partial make-up case, has an even larger effect on real 
long-term interest rates.  
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d.  Two additional modest departures from the Taylor rule:  Pre-emptive policy 
and a permanently higher inflation target 
 
In figure 3, we consider two other policies that are relatively modest departures 
from the Taylor rule:  Moving aggressively to the zero bound, and, raising the 
long-run inflation target.  As can be seen, neither policy has much of an effect on 
the output gap over the first five years following the shock relative to the 
baseline. The reason the preemptive move to the zero bound has such a small 
effect should be clear:  With this particular shock, the funds rate gets to zero after 
three quarters even under the baseline rule, so there is limited scope for improving 
outcomes by moving aggressively.4   
 
In the simulation represented by the blue line in figure 3, the inflation target is 
raised—permanently—by 1 percentage point to 2.5 percent.5  As in the other 
simulations in this section, this change in policy is assumed to be immediately 
built into agents’ expectations.  As can be seen in the middle left panel, the 
increase in long-run inflation expectations under this policy helps reduce real 
long-term interest rates—although these benefits are limited by the increases in 
nominal long-term interest rates.  Despite this reduction in real long-term interest 
rates, however, the effects on the output gap are minimal in the FRB/US model.  
The reason is that the stimulative effects of lower real rates are offset by adverse 
effects on real wealth caused by higher long-run inflation expectations.  We have 
identified two important through which higher inflation expectations reduce real 
wealth in FRB/US:  First, the real bond holdings of households are reduced by 
higher long-run inflation expectations.  Second, higher inflation interacts with the 
tax code to reduce the long-run capital stock.  While we suspect that the strength 
of these offsetting effects may be unique to the FRB/US model, they nonetheless 
illustrate some of the adverse effects that may result from permanently raising the 
inflation target. 
                                                 
4.  While the policy of moving rapidly to the zero bound had only modest effects in this 
simulation, we have found is stochastic simulations that an ongoing policy of moving rapidly to 
the zero bound when aggregate demand is weak can have important benefits in reducing the 
frequency and severity of zero-bound episodes. 
5.  Note that this exercise does not consider the efficacy of a general policy of having a higher 
inflation target.  Such a policy has been examined using stochastic simulations by—among 
others—Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Coenen, Orphanides, and Williams (2004).  
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In our view, the results from this simulation reinforce the idea that a permanent 
increase in the inflation target is a poor way to address the problems created by 
the zero bound.  First of all, if such a target was not deemed appropriate prior to 
the zero-bound episode, it is difficult to see why it should be thereafter.  Second, 
other policies appear to have better performance in terms of reducing the adverse 
effects of the zero bound on interest rates while having only transitory effects on 
inflation.  Finally, by its nature, this policy change is not one for which a central 
bank could gain a reputation before hand.  Hence, it would have to rely heavily on 
direct effects of the announcement on agents’ behavior, a potentially less-reliable 
mechanism than ongoing experience with a policy. 
 
e.  Price-level targeting and difference rules 
 
In figure 4, we take up policies that are more radical departures from the Taylor 
rule.  One of these is a price-level targeting rule, in which inflation is dropped 
from the rule and replaced by the deviation of the price level from a target level: 
 
 rt = r* + πt + φ 100×(pt – p*t) + β gapt  ,    (3) 
 
where p is the log of the price level and p* is the log of the target price level.  We 
assume that the price-level target increases in line with the target inflation rate of 
1.5 percent.  Under the price-level targeting rule, any shortfall in inflation during 
a period of weak aggregate demand will be made up later, thereby boosting 
expected inflation.  
 
Equation 4 shows the other alternative we consider, a difference rule, in which the 
level of the nominal funds rate is replaced by the change in the funds rate:  
 
 rt - rt-1 = α (πt – π*t) + β gapt .     (4) 
 
The difference rule ensures a high degree of serial correlation in short-term 
interest rates.  Thus, as discussed in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999), it leads 
to larger movements in long-term interest rates for any given movement in short-
term interest rates.  Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) examined the 
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performance of difference rules in five macroeconomic models, including 
FRB/US.  Averaging over the performance in all five models, they concluded that 
values of α = 0.4 and β = 0.4 were preferred, and we use those values here. 
 
In the price-level targeting rule, we assume the same coefficient on the output gap 
as in the Taylor rule, β = 1.0.  For the coefficient on the price-level gap, we 
choose φ = 0.4.  This choice is motivated in part by the results of Orphanides and 
Williams (2002), who found that this value was a robust choice in a differenced 
version of the price-level rule.  In addition, we found that this parameter choice 
led to outcomes for the output gap that were similar to those obtained in the 
absence of the zero bound on nominal interest rates. 
 
The blue line in figure 4 shows the effects of adopting price level targeting.  
Under this policy, the peak effect of the shock on the output gap is about the same 
as in the no-zero-bound case, and output recovers a bit faster.  At least by this 
criterion, then, the price-level-targeting policy can essentially undo the effects of 
the zero bound.  The period for which the interest rate is zero is now about a year 
shorter than in the baseline.  As a consequence, the initial decline in the ten-year 
Treasury rate is a bit smaller.  Inflation is considerably higher under this policy—
its low point is now +3/4 percent.  As is to be expected under a policy in which 
shortfalls in the price level are eventually made up, beginning about six years 
after the initial shock, inflation exceeds its long-run target.  But the excess 
inflation is quite mild—only about 1/4 percentage point.  And inflation eventually 
fades back to its target level.  Real long-term interest rates fall more sharply than 
under the baseline; with nominal rate actually a bit higher, the reason for the 
lower real long rates is higher inflation expectations. 
 
The green line in figure 4 shows the effects of the interest-rate change rule, 
equation 4.  With the parameters we have chosen, the initial shock now has a 
considerably milder effect on the output gap than under the baseline policy 
without the zero bound.  This result suggests that the parameters we have used in 
the change rule are qualitatively much more “aggressive” than those in the 
baseline Taylor rule, and thus may not constitute a fair comparison with the other 
policies.  Nonetheless, this simulation illustrates the potential for the change-type 
policy to offset the effects of the zero bound.  Under the change policy, the short-
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term interest rate reaches the zero bound more gradually than under the Taylor 
rule, but it also remains at the zero bound for about a year-and-a-half longer.  The 
nominal ten-year Treasury rate initially drops a bit less than under the Taylor rule, 
but after a year and a half is about ¼ percentage point lower.  Inflation remains 
remarkably stable in this simulation, in part reflecting the success of this policy in 
stabilizing aggregate demand.  With inflation stable and nominal long-term 
interest rates dropping substantially, real long-term interest rates drop sharply, 
and are in fact lower than in the case in which the zero bound is not imposed.   
 
3.  How robust are these strategies to different expectational assumptions? 
 
So far, we have assumed that all agents in the economy change their methods for 
forming expectations in a model-consistent manner when the central bank 
announces a change in policy.  But while one can point to instances in which 
financial markets appear to have rapidly absorbed the implications of an 
announced change in monetary policy, there is less evidence that other agents in 
the economy are as quick to adjust their expectational processes.  Thus, while we 
believe that the simulations we presented in the previous section are good 
approximations of the average response of the economy to a monetary policy that 
has been in place for some time, and all agents have had an opportunity to learn 
its implications, we believe it is an open question whether they would provide a 
good guide to the economy’s behavior in the immediate aftermath of an 
announced change in policy. 
 
To get a better notion of the importance of expectational assumptions for our 
results, we run the following experiment.  We continue to assume that bond 
yields, equity prices, and the exchange rate are priced in a rational manner—that 
is, expectations for the financial variables used in their pricing formulas are fully 
model-consistent.  But we assume that expectations outside the financial sector 
more closely conform to the average historical behavior of the economy.  
Specifically, we generate expectations of future income, inflation, and other non-
financial factors using the forecasts of an estimated small-scale VAR model.  
Under many conditions, the predictions from this small model are similar to those 
generated by the full-scale FRB/US model under model-consistent expectations 
(Brayton et al, 1997).  But this similarity may break down in the circumstances 
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considered here because the simulated zero-bound episode is so atypical from a 
historical perspective.  For example, the VAR forecasts implicitly assume that the 
aggregate demand shock will be of typical duration when in fact it turns out to be 
unusually persistent.  Moreover, the VAR forecasts do not impose the zero lower 
bound on the funds rate, implying that agents see the central bank as having more 
ability to stabilize the economy than it in fact does.  Finally, the small-model 
forecasts are not derived using the actual monetary policy pursued by the central 
bank, but instead are based on the fixed estimated historical policy rule embedded 
in the VAR model. 
 
As might be expected, the change in expectational assumptions has important 
implications for the dynamic response of the economy to the shock.  As can be 
seen in the blue line in figure 5, the zero lower bound is no longer a constraint on 
monetary policy.  The milder response of both output and inflation under these 
conditions mostly reflects the combination of two factors—investors’ recognition 
that the shock will be unusually persistent; and the failure of agents outside the 
financial sector to recognize this persistence.  Because of the first factor, bond 
rates immediately drop following the onset of the shock, thereby supporting 
aggregate spending in a manner similar to what occurs under full model-
consistent expectations.  However, because households and firms do not 
recognize the full extent of the future decline in income and earnings implied by 
the shock, they cut back on spending by less than what occurs in the absence of 
expectational errors.  The net effect of these two events is a much milder 
recession and a smaller initial decline in inflation.  Nonetheless, there is a more 
pronounced longer-run decline in inflation under VAR-based expectations 
because long-run inflation expectations outside the financial sector are less firmly 
anchored.6 
 
To evaluate the relative performance in zero-bound episodes of different 
                                                 
6.  As noted, the bond market’s immediate recognition of the unusual persistence of the aggregate 
demand shock is a major factor checking the severity of the resulting economic downturn.  
However, one can easily think of situations where this might not be the case, in which financial 
market participants would still form their expectations in a rational model-consistent manner but 
would mistakenly project the shock at each point in time to fade away in a historically typically 
manner.  In additional simulations (not shown), we have explored the possibility that the financial 
markets do not have perfect foresight.  Under these circumstances, the initial decline in the bond 
rate is much more gradual, resulting in a downturn in economic activity that is only a little less 
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monetary policies under the alternative expectational assumption, we recalibrated 
the aggregate demand shock to yield a zero-bound episode of approximately the 
same duration as that considered earlier.  (The recalibrated shock needs to be 
approximately twice as large as the original shock under the assumption that 
investors immediately recognize its true persistence.)  The result is shown in 
figure 6.  Compared to the situation in which all agents have model-consistent 
expectations, the constraint posed by the zero lower bound under the standard 
Taylor rule is now less detrimental.  In part, this is because inflation is more 
inertial under VAR-based expectations, making the initial fall in inflation less 
severe and causing the unconstrained Taylor rule to prescribe less of a decline in 
the nominal funds rate.  As a consequence, the decline in output under the 
constrained Taylor rule is only modestly more severe than the unconstrained 
result.  
 
Figure 6 also shows that, under the alternative expectational assumptions, policies 
intended to mitigate the effects of the zero lower bound are considerably less 
effective.  For example, the Reifschneider-Williams rule, despite keeping the 
nominal funds rate at zero for an additional 2-1/2 years, yields essentially the 
same decline in output as the constrained Taylor rule during the first three years 
of the slowdown, and only modestly stronger real activity thereafter.  Roughly the 
same result is obtained under price level targeting:  Although this rule still yields 
better outcomes than either the constrained Taylor rule or the interest-rate make-
up rule, it is no longer able to undo the consequences of the zero lower bound.7 
 
What accounts for this pronounced change in the relative performance of the 
alternative policy rules?  The main factor is that the promise of future policy 
actions beyond the zero-bound period no longer exerts as much influence on the 
longer-run inflation expectations of households and firms under VAR-based 
expectations.  Financial market participants still know that these alternative 
                                                                                                                                     
pronounced than the situation under full model-consistent expectations with perfect foresight. 
7.  It is worth noting that price level targeting yields borderline instability in FRB/US when it is 
run under these expectational assumptions.  For this reason, in the simulation shown in figure 6, 
we assumed that the central bank pursues price-level targeting for only twenty years (a sufficient 
time to bring the price level back to baseline); past that point the funds rate is set using the Taylor 
rule.  Such instability problems also arise in the case of the change rule, and are in fact so severe 
that they make such a rule unusable in FRB/US when run under VAR-based expectations.  As 
noted by Taylor (1999), such instability is often produced by such rules in models run without 
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policies will result in lower real short-term interest rates and higher inflation 
down the road relative to what occurs under the Taylor rule, and accordingly price 
these expectations into nominal bond yields immediately following the onset of 
the shock.  However, because other agents do not recognize that the alternative 
monetary policies have significantly different implications for future inflation, 
their long-run inflation expectations are not greatly affected by any promised 
change in monetary policy.  Thus, announcing a switch to the Reifschneider-
Williams rule or price-level targeting does not result in a jump in their inflation 
expectations relative to their expectations under the Taylor rule, and therefore 
does not result in a lower initial level of real bond rates relative to what happens 
under the Taylor rule.  Given little difference in the perceived initial level of real 
long-term interest rates, outcomes for output and inflation turn out to be almost 
the same. 
 
These simulations suggest that for the expectations-based policies considered here 
to be effective, it is not enough to convince the bond market; households and 
firms need to understand the implications of the change in policy, as well.  While 
history suggests that financial markets pay close attention to announcements of 
monetary-policy changes, it is less clear that other agents do so.  This analysis 
suggests that it may be well for a central bank pursuing a low inflation target to 
make clear what policy will be when confronted with the zero bound well before 
any zero-bound episode occurs.  Furthermore, it suggests that policies that allow 
the central bank to demonstrate the new policy before interest rates hit zero—such 
as a more-aggressive policy or a price-level target—may be preferable to policies 
such as the make-up rule that only come into play once the zero bound is hit. 
 
4.  Fiscal policy under the zero bound 
 
Although the ability of conventional monetary policy to stabilize the economy is 
greatly diminished during zero-bound episodes, there is no obvious reason why 
similar concerns should apply to fiscal policy.  And in fact, there are even reasons 
to believe that the potency of fiscal policy should be enhanced at such times.  To 
see this, note that an expansionary shift in fiscal policy, if sustained, raises the 
economy’s equilibrium real interest rate.  As a result, the enactment of a 
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persistent increase in government spending or cut in taxes generally leads to an 
immediate rise in both nominal and real long-term interest rates (all else equal) 
because investors foresee a higher future path for the real funds rate.  This 
revision in financial conditions, in turn, limits the net stimulus from fiscal 
expansion.  However, when short-term interest rates are pinned at zero, monetary 
policy may not turn more restrictive for a considerable time because nominal 
short-term rates are starting out higher than an unconstrained policy rule would 
prescribe.  Understanding this, investors would mark up their expectations for the 
future path of the funds rate by less than they would in the absence of the zero 
bound, resulting in a smaller rise in the bond rate and more net stimulus to 
aggregate demand from the fiscal policy action. 
 
Based on these considerations, it would not be surprising to find that fiscal policy 
has an important influence on the evolution of the overall economy during zero-
bound episodes.  To illustrate this influence, we now consider results from 
simulations in which fiscal policy accommodates the aggregate demand shock to 
varying degrees.   
 
In the baseline fiscal response—which has been incorporated in all the 
simulations discussed to this point—fiscal policy is modestly accommodative.  
Specifically, real government spending on goods and services is held constant at 
its baseline path, while government transfer payments respond to changes in the 
cyclical state of the economy by the amount observed historically.  Interest 
expense evolves endogenously in response to changes in interest rates and the 
outstanding stock of government debt.  On the revenue side, effective tax rates 
respond to cyclical changes in economic activity to the degree observed 
historically, but are otherwise unchanged during the first fifteen years of the 
simulation.  As a result, the government’s budget deficit widens for a 
considerable time following the aggregate demand shock, increasing the stock of 
government debt relative to GDP by about 9 percentage points after six years.  
Note that in these simulations—including those in earlier sections—personal 
income tax rates adjust endogenously starting in the fifteenth year to push the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio gradually back to baseline. 
 
We now consider two alternative fiscal policies.  Under the easy fiscal policy 
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response, conditions are the same as under the baseline policy except that the 
government enacts a major cut in personal income taxes.  Because of delays in the 
legislative process, the tax cut is assumed to begin one year after the aggregate 
demand shock first hits the economy; however, in the prior year all agents 
correctly anticipate the legislation’s enactment.  The tax cut amounts to 1 percent 
of GDP as computed on an ex ante basis, and lasts for five years.  Although the 
easy fiscal policy yields a larger rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the medium term 
(11 percentage points), all agents understand that tax rates will be adjusted 
beginning in the fifteenth year to eventually return the ratio to baseline.   
 
Conditions are reversed under the tighter fiscal policy response, in that the 
government enacts a personal income tax increase worth 1 percent of GDP (ex 
ante).  As before, the change in fiscal policy begins one year after the aggregate 
demand shock first hits the economy and lasts five years.  Although fiscal policy 
is tighter, the government budget deficit still swells during the economic 
slowdown.  However, the medium-term rise in government indebtedness is 
substantially smaller, amounting to only 7 percent of GDP. 
 
Simulation results under the three alternative fiscal policies are shown in figure 7; 
all results are generated using the Taylor rule and full model-consistent 
expectations.  As expected, the easier fiscal policy shortens the duration of the 
zero-bound episode and shifts up the subsequent path of the federal funds rate, 
thereby reducing the initial fall in the nominal bond rate that follows the onset of 
the aggregate demand shock.  However, because long-run inflation expectations 
rise by a corresponding amount, the change in the real bond rate is about the same 
under the baseline and easier fiscal policies.  Thus, the greater stimulus provided 
by the tax cuts of the easier fiscal policy is not appreciably offset by higher real 
interest rates, and the fall in the output gap is smaller.8 
 
Although one might expect the opposite situation to hold in the case of a tighter 
fiscal policy, in fact the economy turns out to respond in a somewhat asymmetric 
                                                 
8.  If the fiscal simulations are re-run removing the zero-lower-bound constraint on nominal 
interest rates, the asymmetric response of output and inflation between the easier and tighter fiscal 
policies is eliminated.  In addition, the differences in economic outcomes under the three fiscal 
policy assumptions are sharply reduced because endogenous movements in long-term interest rates 
largely offset changes in fiscal policy.  This property of the FRB/US model is discussed at length 
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fashion.  By reducing the deterioration in the government budget balance, the 
duration of the zero-bound episode is increased and the subsequent path of the 
nominal funds rate is reduced, the reverse of what occurs under the easier fiscal 
policy.  Symmetrically, this causes the initial decline in the nominal funds rate to 
be greater than under the baseline fiscal policy.  However, inflation expectations 
do not respond in a symmetric manner.  Because of the zero lower bound, the 
central bank cannot readily adjust to tighter fiscal policy by running a marginally 
easier monetary policy.  As a result, inflation expectations fall by a proportionally 
greater amount under the tighter fiscal policy, causing the initial decline in real 
bond rates to be less than under the baseline fiscal policy even though taxes are 
higher.  Accordingly, the magnitude of the economic slump is greatly increased. 
 
Three lessons from these simulations seem clear.  First, even if the central bank’s 
ability to stabilize the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates, fiscal policy can still be used to stimulate real activity and 
limit any undesirable declines in inflation.  Second, the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy as a stabilization tool is probably enhanced by the zero lower bound, not 
diminished.  Third, tightening the stance of fiscal policy during a zero-bound 
episode is potentially quite destabilizing because of asymmetries in inflation and 
output dynamics under such conditions.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
                                                                                                                                     
in Elmendorf and Reifschneider (2002). 
 
The simulations we have presented suggest that a central bank has a number of 
options that can significantly mitigate the implications of the zero bound on 
nominal interest rates for the severity of recessions.  Policy changes that seemed 
particularly effective include a more-aggressive inflation-targeting policy; a 
monetary policy that promises to make up any shortfall in interest rates induced 
by the zero bound; and a policy of price-level targeting.   
 
These policies, however, rely critically on firms and households forming inflation 
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expectations in a manner that is fully consistent with these policies.  We found 
that it is not enough for financial markets to understand the implications of these 
policies for future monetary policy; it is also important for households and firms 
to understand their implications for future policy, and thus for future inflation.  
 
Our results are thus more sanguine for general changes in policy than changes 
made once the zero bound is reached.  In particular, our results suggest that a 
central bank that wishes to operate with a low inflation target should also make 
other changes to policy—such as adopting a more-aggressive policy or to a price-
level target.  Because changing the inflation target is already an important change 
in monetary policy, adopting other changes at the same time would be opportune. 
 At a minimum, a central bank with a low inflation target should make clear what 
their policies would be in the event of a zero-bound episode, perhaps along the 
lines of the interest-rate make-up policy. 
 
A central bank that finds itself already confronted with the zero bound must rely 
to a greater extent on persuasion so as to affect the inflation expectations of 
households and firms.  A strategy of talking up inflation expectations—within the 
context of one of the general strategies we have discussed—would be important.  
Nonetheless, our results also suggested that announcing a permanent change in 
the inflation target is neither necessary nor particularly effective, at least in the 
context of the FRB/US model.  Rather, announcing that policy will be looser than 
usual for a period that is sustained but ultimately finite would be sufficient. 
 
Finally, we would like to indicate that a useful supplement to the kind of analysis 
we have undertaken here would be stochastic simulations.  Based on earlier work 
by Reifschneider and Williams (2000), we believe that our main conclusions 
would be supported by such an exercise.  In particular, Reifschneider and 
Williams found that aggressive Taylor rules and interest-rate make-up policies 
were effective at reducing the consequences of the zero bound on nominal interest 
rates in the FRB/US model.  In future work, we hope to explore the implications 
of price-level targeting using stochastic simulations and also to explore the 
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Figure 1
Macroeconomic Effects of a Large Demand Shock
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Figure 2
Macroeconomic Effects of a Large Demand Shock
Under the Reifschneider-Williams Rule,
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Figure 3
Macroeconomic Effects of a Large Demand Shock
Under the Taylor Rule with Either a Preemptive Policy Response
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Figure 4
Macroeconomic Effects of a Large Demand Shock
Under Price Level Targeting and the Change Rule
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Figure 5
Implications of Replacing Model-Consistent Expectations
With VAR-Based Expectations Outside the Financial Sector
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Figure 6
Comparative Performance of the Taylor Rule, Price Level Targeting,
and the Reifschneider-Williams Rule in the Face of a Large Demand Shock
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Figure 7
Macroeconomic Effects of a Large Demand Shock
Under the Taylor Rule, Full Model-Consistent Expectations,
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